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Evolution of an Eighth Amendment
Dichotomy: Substantive and Procedural
Protections within the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause in Capital Cases
Kimberly A. Orem*
I. Introduction
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia' found
that the death penalty as applied in the state statutory schemes under its
review constituted "cruel and unusual" punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.2
The Court concluded that these standardless sentencing schemes failed to
provide capital judges and juries with a rational basis to distinguish those
who should die from those who should live.' However, it was not until
1976, in Gregg v. Georgia,4 that the Court addressed whether the death
penalty could be applied in a constitutional manner.5 Gregg addressed the
* J.D. Candidate, May 2001, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.A.,
University of Richmond. Thanks to my family for their support and guidance, Fred for his
inspiration, and Professor Roger Groot for his instruction.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that the death penalty as applied in the
state statutes before the Court violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution).
2. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). The full text of the Eighth
Amendment reads as follows: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted" U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis
added). The Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment has been
incorporated through the due process protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to
the states. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962).
3. Furman, 408 U.S. at 293-94 (Brennan, J., concurring).
4. 428 U.S. 153, 186-87 (1976) (holding that the death penalty does not invariably
violate the Constitution).
5. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). On the same day that it decided Gregg, the
Court also decided four other capital cases in which Eighth Amendment issues were raised.
See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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concerns voiced in Furman by incorporating substantive and procedural
protections. The Gregg Court rejected the per se unconstitutionality of the
death penalty and launched the arguably dichotomous stream of Eighth
Amendment death penalty jurisprudence that has evolved since the death
penalty's reinstatement.
The protections of the Eighth Amendment in this context can be
classified as either "substantive" or "procedural."6 A death penalty statute
passes "procedural" Eighth Amendment muster if the concerns of Furman
can be met by inserting certain safeguards into the capital trial and sentenc-
ing process to prevent the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death
penalty. To meet this end, many states have attempted to narrow the class
of death eligible persons by: (1) identifying specific crimes for which the
death penalty can be imposed; (2) requiring the sentencer to find at least one
clearly defined aggravating factor before recommending death; and (3)
assuring the sentencing body's access to mitigation evidence prior to sen-
tencing! Procedures such as these do not necessarily correct for the frailties
deduced by the Court under the Eighth Amendment's "substantive"
protections-that is, execution for certain offenses and in certain circum-
stances is unconstitutional, regardless of procedural protections! Such
categorical prohibitions are based upon the conclusion that, in these situa-
tions, execution would either be grossly disproportionate to the severity of
the crime or involve unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and would
offend the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."9 The analysis the Court uses to cure certain deficiencies
with procedural mechanisms and others with substantive protection may
fairly be called "dichotomous" for attempting to employ rationales which
are at odds with one another.
Recent cases have revealed the potentially devastating effect of this
dualistic analysis.'0 Once a case has been read to implicate the "procedural"
6. Note that the Supreme Court has neither explicitly recognized nor discussed the
categorizations discussed in this article. The division is, instead, evidenced by the analyses
used in the Court's capital jurisprudence and serves merely to facilitate an understanding of
the type of Eighth Amendment analysis the Court may employ in a particular case. At times,
the Court has used the terms "procedural" and "substantive" in the capital context, but not
necessarily in the manner discussed in this article.
7. See generally McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (note that many people read
this case to stand only for the proposition that statistical racial disparity will not be used to
find the death penalty unconstitutional).
8. For example, execution of the mentally insane has been held by the Court to be
unconstitutional under all circumstances despite procedural protections. See Ford v..Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
9. Trop v. Dules, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (recognizing the dynamic nature of the
Eighth Amendment).
10. See infra Part IV of this article for discussion of this recent application of the
dichotomy.
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aspect of the dichotomy, and the potential infirmities of death penalty
infliction in the situation are therefore "curable," the Eighth Amendment
works to protect the capital defendant only in assuring his right to a fair
trial. Although the guarantee of a fair and procedurally valid trial is cer-
tainly a beneficial guarantee, it provides little solace to the capital defendant
who attempts to raise an Eighth Amendment issue, such as actual innocence,
after trial and sentencing." It is certainly arguable that the execution of an
innocent person is "cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment.12 However, in Herrera v. Collins,3 the Court refused to
acknowledge this and, instead, decided that the petitioner had not made a
strong enough showing of actual innocence to meet the high standard the
Court would hypothetically apply if, as the Court assumed arguendo, such
an execution would constitute "cruel and unusual" punishment.14 Until the
Court finds a complete bar to execution of the innocent and chooses,
instead, to handle such cases through procedural analysis, the Court could
be said to imply that execution of an innocent person who has received a
fair capital trial is constitutional. This is the current understanding; thus,
the Eighth Amendment now essentially serves as a due process protection
for the capital defendant at trial and sentencing and no more."5
This article will track the evolution of the Eighth Amendment dualism,
from Furman to its modem implications, detailing the procedural and
substantive protections which the Eighth Amendment guarantees and
discussing some that it does not.
11. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 397-98 (1993) (holding that a claim of actual
innocence based upon newly acquired evidence is not, in and of itself, a basis for federal
habeas relief.
12. See id. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (recognizing the "fundamental legal
principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution"); id. at 430
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that "[n]othing could be more contrary to contemporary
standards of decency... or more shocking to the conscience... than to execute a person
who is actually innocent") (citations omitted).
13. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
14. Id. at 417-19. The Court's treatment of Herrera's claim left open the option of
articulating a standard for future cases in which a stronger showing of actual innocence is
argued.
15. Furthermore, in its arguably shocking decision in Strickler v. Greene, the Court
implied that if sufficient evidence of a capital defendant's guilt exists, he may not even be
assured the procedural safeguards presumably guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment
procedural jurisprudence. 119 S. Ct. 1936 (1999). In Strickler the Court affirmed the convic-
tion and death sentence after refusing to grant Strickler relief on his claim of withheld
evidence because of his failure to show materiality under the Brady standard and prejudice
to excuse his procedural default of this claim. Id. at 1955.
2000]
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II. Procedural Eighth Amendment Guarantees
A. The Furman Mandate and Gregg's Response
The Court has said on many occasions that the unique nature of the
death penalty carries with it a need for heightened reliability in the proce-
dures by which it is imposed.16 This need for a heightened degree of cer-
tainty in capital cases made the Furman Court especially concerned about
the "wantonly" and "freakishly" inflicted death sentences under the statutes
it considered.'" In Gregg the Court interpreted Furman to mandate "that
where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the
determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk
of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." 8 Gregg suggests that the con-
cerns voiced in Furman can be met by a "carefully drafted statute that
ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and
guidance" which is best served by a "bifurcated proceeding at which the
sentencing authority is apprised [sic] of the information relevant to the
imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the
information." The Gregg Court stressed that bifurcation of the trial into
guilt and sentencing phases would help to eliminate some of the constitu-
tional deficiencies identified in Furman.2"
B. Aggravating Circumstances and Mandatory Death Sentences
The inclusion of aggravating factors in state capital sentencing schemes
has not always lead to their constitutional affirmation. To meet the Eighth
Amendment's demands, states must "define the crimes for which death may
be the sentence in a way that obviates 'standardless [sentencing]
discretion."21 In Godfrey v. Georgia22 the Court evaluated Georgia's designa-
tion of the "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" nature
of the offense as an aggravating factor which triggered the possibility of a
death sentence. 3 Analyzing this factor in light of its use and the lack of jury
guidance supplied by the Georgia courts, the Court found the factor to be
16. See generally Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 456 (1984); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
17. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
18. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
19. Id. at 195. The Court went on to examine and uphold the constitutionality of the
method Georgia used to adapt its statute to meet the Furman concerns. Id. at 196-207.
20. Id. at 191-92.
21. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196 n.47).
22. 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (holding that the failure of a certain aggravating factor to
distinguish the case under review in which the death penalty was imposed from other cases
in which it was not mandated reversal of the death sentence).
23. Id. at 428.
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unconstitutionally vague because it did not restrain the arbitrary and capri-
cious infliction of the death penalty.24
In an attempt to limit sentencing discretion in death penalty cases in
accord with Furman, some states, such as North Carolina, simply eliminated
jury discretion and automatically imposed death sentences for capital crimes
upon a finding of guilt.25 In Woodson v. North Carolina6 the Court ad-
dressed this statutory answer to Furman's rejection of "unbridled jury
discretion" in the capital context.2 The Court found North Carolina's
attempt inadequate to meet Furman's demand to replace "arbitrary and
wanton jury discretion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and
make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death."28
The Court in Woodson also found that the North Carolina statute did not
adequately allow individualized consideration of both the offender and the
offense.29 Although the Court recognized the lack of a clear textual consti-
tutional mandate of individualized inquiry, it held that "in capital cases the
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment...
requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender
and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indis-
pensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."3" Therefore,
the mandatory nature of the sentencing scheme eliminated individual
24. Id.; see also Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 360-66 (1988) (holding the
.especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance to be unconstitutional
vague for similar reasons). In Maynard the Court emphasized the "fundamental constitu-
tional requirement" of "channeling and limiting... the sentencer's discretion in imposing
the death penalty." Id. at 362. However, not all challenges to similarly worded aggravating
factors for vagueness have been successful. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1976)
(holding that the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" and the "knowingly created a great
risk of death to many persons" aggravators were not unconstitutionally vague as construed
by the Supreme Court of Florida).
25. See N.C. GEN. STAT. S 14-17 (1975).
26. 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (declaring the North Carolina mandatory death penalty
scheme unconstitutional). Note that the Court did not pass on the constitutionality of a
mandatory death penalty statute limited to an extremely narrow category of homicide. Id.
at 287 n.7. However, the Court did decide this issue in Sumnerv. Shuman, holding that even
when narrowly tailored, the mandatory death sentence statute did not allow consideration
of relevant mitigating circumstances and thus could not be reconciled with the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 483 U.S. 66, 77-78 (1987).
27. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302 (1976).
28. Id. at 303.
29. Id. at 304.
30. Id.; see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1976) (holding that a
mandatory death sentence statute failed to comply with Furman's requirement that unbridled
jury discretion be replaced by procedures that safeguard against arbitrary and capricious
imposition of death sentences).
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considerations fundamental to the constitutional imposition of the death
penalty."
C. Mitigation and Individualized Sentencing
In tension with this duty of the states to limit discretion of the sentenc-
ing body is the duty also to provide it with all relevant mitigation informa-
tion so that the sentencing body may make an individualized determination
as to whether the death penalty is warranted in each specific case. In Lockett
v. Ohio32 the Court emphasized that the widely accepted notion of individu-
alization of sentences in noncapital cases holds even more importance in
capital cases because of the unique and final nature of the death penalty."
The Court emphasized that "where sentencing discretion is granted, it
generally has been agreed that the sentencing judge's possession of the fullest
information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics is
[h]ighly relevant-if not essential-[to the] selection of an appropriate sen-
tence."34 In Eddings v. Oklahoma" the Court likewise found that, just as a
state may not constitutionally bar the sentencing body's access to mitigation
material, neither can the sentencer refuse to consider relevant mitigating
evidence.36 This tension between limiting the jury's discretion while allow-
ing it maximum access to mitigation evidence for an individualized determi-
nation might have led to inconsistency. However, because the Court has
never held that there must be completely unlimited or unguided discretion,
even as to consideration of mitigating evidence, that has not occurred.37
31. But see Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 (1990) (holding mandatory
imposition of a death sentence if jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance
and no mitigating circumstances, or where the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances, constitutional so long as jury is able to consider and give effect to
all relevant mitigating evidence).
32. 438 U.S. 586, 608-09 (1978) (holding that limits imposed on mitigation material
available to the sentencer violated the Constitution).
33. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978).
34. Id. at 602-03 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in
original).
35. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
36. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112-17 (1982).
37. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181-82 (1988) (plurality opinion) (rejecting
the interpretation of Lockett to mean that the state has no role in structuring the jury's
consideration of mitigation evidence). The Court has occasionally discussed this tension
within the Eighth Amendment capital jurisprudence and has assessed Eighth Amendment
compliance of the capital sentencing schemes under review by looking to whether the states
acted to resolve this tension through mechanisms that both prohibit the arbitrary imposition
of the death penalty and also provide the jury with sufficient access to mitigation. See
generally Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544-45
(1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875-77 (1983). Lower
courts have upheld certain restrictions on presentation of mitigation evidence, perhaps to
avoid arbitrary capital sentencing decisions which would render the imposition of the death
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IlL Substantively Protected Eighth Amendment Categories
In defining what constitutes "cruel and unusual" punishment, the Court
has consistently construed the Eighth Amendment to provide protection,
not only from barbarous and torturous methods of punishment, but also to
provide protection "against all punishments which, by their excessive length
or severity, are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged."" As it is
not limited to the methods of punishment thought to be cruel and unusual
at the time of the Amendment's enactment, this interpretation manifests the
evolving and dynamic nature of the Eighth Amendment analysis. 9
Through Eighth Amendment substantive protections, the Court has held
the imposition of the death penalty for certain crimes and certain offenders
unconstitutional per se. No procedural protections can be used to make the
imposition of the death penalty constitutional in such cases. The categories for
which the Court has granted immunity from death sentences include the
following: (1) execution of defendants who were convicted for acts commit-
ted while fifteen years old or younger;' (2) execution of those who have
become insane post-trial;4 (3) execution for rape of an adult woman, with-
out more;42 and (4) execution for accomplices to a murder in which the
accomplice did not take a human life or act with reckless disregard for
human life.43
A. Age of the Offender
The Court has read the Eighth Amendment substantive protection
against cruel and unusual punishment to bar infliction of the death penalty
penalty unconstitutional. See Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 642, 653 (Va. 1999)
(disallowing evidence of the nature of prison life as mitigation to combat a finding of future
dangerousness); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-30 (1991) (overruling the
holding in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), that the Eighth Amendment acts as aper
se bar on admission of victim impact evidence and leaving the decision whether to admit such
evidence during sentencing to the states).
38. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Note that the Court's use of the term "disproportionate" in many cases
which analyze the substantive Eighth Amendment protection does not imply the necessity
of proportionality review, the comparison by a reviewing court of the defendant's sentence
with other capital defendants whose cases and individual characteristics are similar. Instead,
this "disproportionality" refers to the "abstract evaluation of the appropriateness of a
sentence for a particular crime." Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1984). The Court has
disavowed any Eighth Amendment requirement for proportionality review, although it may
be used as a device by which a state's statutory scheme meets the concerns voiced in Furman.
Id. at 50-51.
39. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986).
40. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
41. See Ford, 477 U.S. 399.
42. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
43. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
2000]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
on capital defendants who committed the capital crime while they were
fifteen years old or younger. In Thompson v. Oklahoma" the Court dis-
cussed how "evolving standards of decency" consider capital punishment of
one under the age of sixteen at the time of the offense by examining the
work product of state legislatures and sentencing juries."' The Court found
that society seems to draw the line between childhood and adulthood at
sixteen years of age at the earliest.' Although most state legislatures had not
specifically addressed the minimum age for infliction of the death penalty,
all eighteen states that had done so required a defendant to have attained at
least the age of sixteen at the time of his or her capital offense.47 Consider-
ing the behavior of juries, the Court came to the conclusion that "imposi-
tion of the death penalty on a 15-year-old [sic] offender is now generally
abhorrent to the conscience of the community.
"4s
The Court concluded its inquiry by stressing that it, the Court, was the
final arbiter of the constitutionality of such executions. Considering the
lower level of culpability of fifteen-year-old offenders and the absence of
retributive or deterrent effects of such executions, the Court held that such
executions were "nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposi-
tion of pain and suffering" and, thus, were unconstitutional.' Despite the
seemingly protective stance of the Court on the subject of juveniles, the
Court has held sentencing schemes which allow execution of sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old capital defendants to be constitutional."'
B. Insanity
In Ford v. Wainwrights2 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits states from imposing the death penalty on a prisoner who is
44. 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
rohibit the execution of a person who was under sixteen years of age at the time of his or
er offense).
45. Id. at 821-22 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 358 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
46. Id. at 824. The Court here considered the line society has drawn between child-
hood and adulthood in such contexts as the rights to vote, serve on a jury, drive, marry,
purchase pornographic materials, and gamble. Id. & nn.16-21.
47. Id. at 826-29 & nn.24-30.
48. Id. at 832. The Court here looked to actual sentencing decisions of juries, as
compiled and analyzed in private studies as well as by the Department of Justice. Id.
49. Id. at 833 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
50. Id. at 836-38 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
51. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,380 (1989) (holding imposition of the death
penalty on murderers sixteen and seventeen years of age consistent with the Eighth Amend-
ment).
52. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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insane. 3 The Court recognized that the Eighth Amendment protection
covers both acts of punishment considered cruel and unusual at the time of
the adoption of the Bill of Rights and also those which society now consid-
ers by consensus to be cruel and unusual.-' Thus, the Eighth Amendment
analysis is an evolving one. The Court in Ford found no basis to condone
execution of the insane at English common law or within modem commu-
nity standards or modern penal justifications and, hence, held such execu-
tions unconstitutional."5 The Court, finding a lack of a national consensus
against executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses,
subsequently declined to extend this ban to execution of the mentally
retarded."6
C, Rape ofan Adult Woman, Without More
In Coker v. Georgia7 the Court held that a sentence of death for the
crime of rape of an adult woman, without more, was grossly disproportion-
ate and excessive punishment and was forbidden by the Eighth Amend-
ment. 8 The Court reiterated its excessiveness inquiry as stated in Gregg as
53. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
54. Id. at 405-06.
55. Id. at 406-10. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently
addressed the execution of the insane in Swann v. Taylor, No. 98-20, 1999 WL 92435, at * 1
(4th Cir. Feb. 18, 1999), in which it emphasized that a Ford claim is not ripe for review until
execution is imminent. Id., at "17-18. Thus, a Ford claim may be raised late in the habeas
proceedings and is not vulnerable to procedural default in the earlier stages of the appellate
process. When Swann did raise this claim, it was rejected in the Virginia courts and certiorari
was denied by the United States Supreme Court. See Swann v. Taylor, 119 S. Ct. 1591 (1999)
(mem.). However, the second avenue of redress on such Ford claims came to Swann's rescue
in the eleventh hour when Governor James S. Gilmore granted Swarm clemency. Gilmore
commuted Swann's sentence to life imprisonment without parole only four hours before his
scheduled execution due to Swann's severe mental impairment. See Frank Green, Gilmore
Grants Swann Clemency Sentence Commuted to Life Without Parole, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, May 13,1999, at A 1, available in 1999 WL 4355070; Calvin Swann Gilmore Gives
Life, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER-STAR (Norfolk, VA), May 14, 1999, at B 10, available in
1999 WL 7164912. For a more detailed discussion of Swann, see Kimberly A. Orem, Case
Note, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 191 (1999) (analyzing Swann).
56. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
57. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
58. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977). Coker was convicted under section 26-
2001 of the Georgia Code, which read that "[a] person convicted of rape shall be punished by
death or by imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than
20 [sic] years." GA. CODE ANN. S 26-2001 (1972). This statute, on its face, does not differenti-
ate on the basis of age of the victim, thereby including rape of an adult woman within its
scope. Note that the victim in this case was a sixteen-year-old woman, considered an adult
merely because she was married. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 605 (Burger, J., dissenting). Because
this woman could be viewed as a minor since she was under the age of eighteen, this was an
arguably striking decision for the Court to choose to decide the constitutionality of the death
2000]
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finding unconstitutional a punishment which "(1) makes no measurable
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more
than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." 9 Emphasizing the
omission of the rape of an adult woman in other state capital statutes as well
as the infrequency with which Georgia juries had recommended death based
on this charge, the Court next turned to its constitutional analysis.'
Although the Court recognized the serious nature of the offense, it found
that rape of an adult woman could not compare with the severity of murder,
which entails an unjustified taking of a human life, and thus could not
warrant the uniquely severe and final penalty of death.61
D. Accomplices to Murder
In Enmund v. Florida62 the Court held the death penalty disproportion-
ate, and thus unconstitutional, when imposed for aiding and abetting mur-
der when the defendant does not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill the
victim.63 Taking the same approach as it did in Coker, the Court found that
few jurisdictions authorized the death penalty solely for participation in a
robbery in which a life is taken by another and, further, that juries have
repudiated imyosition of the death penalty for non-triggerman convictions
in robberies. The Court went on to consider the constitutionality of the
imposition of the death penalty for crimes of this nature and found that the
lower degree of culpability of Enmund in these circumstances destroyed any
retributive or deterrent value of infliction of the death penalty in his case
penalty for the rape of an adult woman. Hence, per the broad holding in Coker, rape of a
minor who is legally considered to be an adult woman due to her marital status cannot,
without more, constitutionally warrant the death penalty even though the Court noted the
acceptance of death sentences for rape of a minor in two other jurisdictions. See id. at 595-96.
59. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
60. Id. at 595-97. The Court has noted that one of the jury's most important functions
in capital sentencing is to "maintain a link between contemporary community values and the
penal system-a link without which the determination of punishment would hardly reflect
'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'"
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.15 (1968) (citation omitted).
61. Coker, 433 U.S. at 598. But see id. at 603 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (finding the Court's holding overbroad and hypothesizing the constitutionality of
the death penalty for aggravated rapes involving a higher degree of brutality); id. at 606-11
(Burger, J., dissenting) (finding the Court's holding overbroad, thus impinging on states'
rights and unnecessarily offending the tenets of federalism).
62. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
63. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982). Note that application of the "murder-
for-hire" and "murder by direction" capital statutory provisions used in such states as Virginia
is dependent upon proof of an intent to kill. See VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(2), (10) (Michie
1999).
64. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 789-97.
[Vol. 12:2
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT DICHOTOMY
and thus would rendering its imposition unconstitutional." In Tison v.
Arizona the Court stressed the importance of the circumstance-specific
individualized culpability inquiry mandated by Coker to determine constitu-
tionality of the death penalty.s Although in Enmund, the mental state was
not culpable enough to warrant the death penalty, the Court held in Tison
that "reckless disregard for human life" represented culpability sufficient to
warrant the constitutional imposition of the death penalty.
67
IV Recent Implications of the Substantive/Procedural Dichotomy
In Herrera v. Collins the Court held that a claim of actual innocence is
not an independent basis for federal habeas relief.6' Herrera argued that the
execution of a person who is innocent of the crime for which he will be
executed violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion.69 The Court relied on its holding in Townsend v. Sain to conclude
that "[c]laims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have
never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independ-
ent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal
proceeding.""1 The Court recognized the presumption of innocence in
criminal cases, but went on to note that once a defendant receives a fair trial
65. Id. at 798-801; see also id. at 827 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the
importance of individualized sentencing, allowing the jury to consider the defendant's role
in the crime and mitigation evidence). But see id. at 816-23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting
the reverence for felony-murder at English common law and in American jurisprudence and
finding fault in the majority's conclusion that contemporary standards preclude imposition
of the death penalty in these cases).
66. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156-58 (1987) (holding that if the individualized
inquiry into a defendant's culpability required in capital cases reveals major participation in
the felony and reckless indifference to human life, the culpability requirement of Enmund
is sufficient to warrant imposition of the death penalty). Note that Justice O'Connor wrote
the majority opinion in this case, advocating the same individualization of sentencing
concerns as she voiced in her Enmund dissent.
67. Id. at 157-58. The facts manifesting culpability in Enmund and Tison make them
dearly distinguishable and, hence, help to explain the difference in Eighth Amendment
protection. Enmund did not actively take part in the events leading to the death, but merely
waited in the get-away car during a residential robbery. In Tison the defendant was armed,
helped abduct the victims of the murders, was present at the murder site, and "could antici-
pate the use of lethal force during" the events leading to the murders. Id. at 145 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
68. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 393 (1993).
69. Id. at 398. Herrera argued both a strict Eighth Amendment challenge as well as a
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process challenge. The latter was similarly rejected by the
Court. Id. at 411.
70. 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963).
71. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400 (emphasis added).
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and is convicted this presumption disappears." Perhaps because it con-
cluded that this presumption evaporates, the Court did not directly address
whether executing an innocent person convicted in a fair and reliable trial
proceeding would violate the Constitution.73 Instead, the majority assumed
arguendo that, where state avenues of redress are closed, a truly persuasive
demonstration of "actual innocence" made after trial would render the
execution unconstitutional and warrant federal habeas relief.74 The majority
of the Court did not articulate the standard a defendant would need to meet
to be granted an evidentiary hearing, but did say that the threshold showing
would necessarily be "extraordinarily high.""5
Although Justice O'Connor in her concurrence argued that the major-
ity ought to avoid answering whether a fairly convicted person can be
executed without an evidentiary hearing on newly discovered innocence
evidence, her concurrence implied that for proof of actual innocence to
offend the Eighth Amendment such evidence would need to make such an
execution a "constitutionally intolerable event." 6 Justice Blackmun, in his
dissent, propounded that such an execution would violate any standard of
decency and read the procedural Eighth Amendment protections to extend
beyond a valid conviction and death sentence." However, even Justice
Blackmun set the standard to warrant the desired evidentiary hearing
extremely high. He would require that a defendant "must show not just
that there was probably a reasonable doubt about his guilt but that he is
probably actually innocent." "'
The Court in Herrera also distinguished another field of "actual
innocence" inquiry. Proof of actual innocence may act to excuse default of
72. Id. at 398-99.
73. Id. at 399-400. The Court stressed the pragmatic concerns of disruption of the
federal appellate system through the possible deluge of capital defendants likely to make such
claims simply to utilize another opportunity for reversal. Id. at 401; see VA. Sup. CT. R. 1:1
(Virginia's "twenty-one day rule" making judgments final twenty-one days after entry of
judgment). The Herrera Court also emphasized the availability of clemency as the historical
remedy for claims of innocence based on newly discovered evidence made outside the time
limit set by the applicable state law. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411-17. This reliance on clemency
is disturbing in many respects. First, there is no "right" to clemency. Clemency exists in
most states as a broad discretionary gubernatorial power to grant clemency to death row
inmates. Further, procedural protections guaranteed within other proceedings in the trial
and appellate processes do not extend to clemency proceedings. See generally Ohio Adult
Parole Authority v. Woodward, 523 U.S. 272, 282 (1998) (describing an appeal for clemency
as a "unilateral hope," unprotected by procedural guarantees) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
74. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he execution of a legally and factually
innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event.").
77. Id. at 431-32 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 434-35 (emphasis added).
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other independentconstitutional claims which may have occurred earlier in
the trial and appellate processes. 9 This so-called "fundamental miscarriage
of justice" exception to the procedural bar of claims where defenses of
abusive or successive use of the writ are raised does not recognize a finding
of "actual innocence" as an independent constitutional claim; rather it is a
"gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise
barred constitutional claim considered on the merits."" In Schiup v. Delo8'
the Court discussed the relation of the "gateway" innocence claim to the
Herrera-style innocence claim.82 The "gateway" innocence claim seeks to
surmount the bar against certain constitutional claims which allege deficien-
cies with the trial procedure. 3 The Herrera claim, in contrast, attempts to
acquire federal habeas relief from the Eighth Amendment on a claim of
actual innocence alone, but claims no other constitutional deficiencies and
concedes a fair trial proceeding.84 The standards which defendants must
meet differ greatly. Herrera claims require a showing of innocence which
would make execution "constitutionally intolerable." "Gateway" innocence
claims need to meet a lesser standard-to raise sufficient doubt about guilt to
make the execution a possible miscarriage of justice unless the conviction
resulted from a fair trial.8"
V Aftermath of Herrera
By deciding Herrera based upon the procedural considerations and
protections within the capital trial and sentencing scheme and refusing to
answer whether execution of the innocent is per se unconstitutional as a
violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Herrera Court abstained from
79. For example, if a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was procedurally
defaulted prior to federal habeas review, a petitioner may yet gain review of such a claim if
he can make the requisite showing of actual innocence.
80. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404.
81. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
82. Schiup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 313-16 (1995).
83. Id. at 315-16.
84. Id. at 315.
85. Id. at 316; see also Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476-79 (9th Cir. 1997) (discuss-
ing the distinction between Herrera claims and "gateway" claims). Schlup mandates that to
prove actual innocence sufficient to allow argument of defaulted constitutional claim of
error, petitioner need show that it is "more likely than not that no reasonable juror would
have convicted him in light of the new evidence." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. However, in a case
in which the petitioner is making a claim that he is not death eligible, another type of
innocence claim, petitioner must show by dear and convincing evidence that, but for a
constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the
death penalty. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992). For a more in-depth discus-
sion of these differing standards, see Matthew S. T. Clark, Case Note, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 435
(2000) (analyzing Graham v. Angelone, No. 99-4, 1999 WL 710385 (4th Cir. Sept. 18, 1999)).
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carving out a new category of substantive Eighth Amendment protection
for the innocent. If innocence falls within the procedural Eighth Amend-
ment analysis, execution of the innocent would be constitutional as long as
procedural protections were assured at trial. Once a "fair" conviction and
sentence are received, it seems that Eighth Amendment protection vanishes
regardless of innocence or guilt. This decision of the Court has shocking
implications when one considers the development of this Eighth Amend-
ment dichotomy.
Innocence appears to have some of the earmarks of the substantively
protected categories discussed within the Eighth Amendment capital juris-
prudence. Two tests that the Court has turned to in finding substantive
protections are (1) whether community consensus shows that "evolving
standards of decency" find punishment under the circumstances of the
offense or characteristics of the offender unacceptable and (2) whether such
executions have retributive or deterrent effects on society. It is fairly easy
to advance the position that community standards would and should shun
execution of innocent people." Further, the ability of capital punishment
to be generally retributive or to deter future crimes in others is dependent
upon the defendant's culpability. In cases of actual innocence, culpability
does not exist. Hence, it would seem feasible for the Court to carve out
such a categorical exception for the same reasons that it has done so in other
instances.
Simulaneously, the Court could impose a high standard to warrant
evidentiary review of innocence claims for the pragmatic reasons which
caused the Court's hesitation to create a substantive bar against execution
of the innocent. Perhaps this is what the Herrera Court intended to do
without explicitly stating its intention. Justice O'Connor emphasized in her
Herrera concurrence that the Court did not "state that the Constitution
permits the execution of. an actually innocent person.""7 However, the
Court also declined to hold that the Constitution forbids such executions.
Hence, one is left waiting for a challenge in which a petitioner can show
compelling evidence of innocence which may warrant a constitutional bar
to his execution and which will permit a showing of innocence as an inde-
86. For example, the state of Illinois has issued a moratorium on executions due to the
"ample evidence that capital punishment is not being administered properly-having seen a
rash of cases in which inmates sentenced death have not only had their convictions over-
turned but have been fully exonerated. The state came uncomfortably close to executing
innocent men. Other states have actually put people to death despite grave doubts about
their guilt." Reality Check on the Death Penalty?, CHi. TRIB., Mar. 3, 1997, at 14, available in
1997 WL 3525729. The imposition of this moratorium by Governor George Ryan and acts
of political leadership in other locales such as in Oregon, Philadelphia, California, and
Maryland manifest political abhorrence for execution of the innocent that should mirror the
community standards on this issue. Nancy J. Bothne, It's Time to Abolish Death Penalty, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 21, 2000, at 16, available in 2000 WL 3638452.
87. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 427 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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pendent basis for federal habeas relief. Until such a challenge is granted
certiorari by the Court, the Eighth Amendment will serve merely as a
procedural protection during trial and a substantive protection for desig-
nated categories of offenders and crimes, thereby assuring the innocent
merely the right to a fair trial. This renders the Eighth Amendment "cruel
and unusual" punishment clause a mere due process clause for Capital trial
and sentencing proceedings when used outside of the few substantively
protected categories.
Another recent decision by the Court appears to take even this consti-
tutionally fair trial right away from capital defendants if sufficient evidence
of their guilt exists. In Strickler v. Greene"8 the Court addressed the situation
in which the credibility of an eyewitness's damning testimony was seriously
called into question by documents not produced by the Commonwealth as
required by Brady.9 In assessing whether sufficient prejudice existed to
warrant reversal of the conviction and death sentence, the Court empha-
sized the existence of "considerable forensic and other physical evidence
linking petitioner to the crime."' This emphasis, paired with the height-
ened standard of prejudice required by the Court to warrant reversal,91
seems to suggest that an apparently guilty defendant does not even deserve
the constitutional procedural protections which an innocent person is
guaranteed at trial and sentencing.
V. Conclusion
The Court has recognized that the Eighth Amendment requires proce-
dural protections. The Court has also recognized that those protections
must be supplemented by substantive bars to the application of the death
penalty. Thus, it has carved out the substantively protected categories
described earlier.92 Although the procedural guarantees have significantly
improved certainty and reliability within the capital trial and appellate
88. 119 S. Ct. 1936 (1999). For a detailed analysis of Strickler, see Ashley Flynn, Case
Note, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 165 (1999) (analyzing Strickler).
89. Strickler v. Greene, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1955 (1999) (holding that the defendant had
failed to show the necessary materiality and prejudice to excuse his procedural default); see
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the "suppression by the prosecution
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution"); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (holding that the
prosecution's duty to disclose extends to impeachment evidence).
.90. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1954 & n.41.
91. The Court required Strickler to demonstrate a "reasonable probability" that his
conviction or sentence would have been different if the damning witness testimony was
sufficiently impeached during his trial; this standard proved impossible to meet in his case.
Id. at 1955.
92. See supra Part H1.
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processes in the United States, the Court's refusal to extend the scope of the
substantive protections has stunted the growth of this important part of the
Eighth Amendment's doctrinal protections.
The deleterious effect of creating a ceiling on the number of substan-
tively protected Eighth Amendment categories within capital cases is exem-
plified by the Court's decision in Penry v. Lynaugh.93 In Penry the Court
refused to extend substantive protection to a classification which should
warrant it by the standards previously enunciated in the Court's own
jurisprudence.94 The Penry Court found that "[t]he common law prohibi-
tion against punishing 'idiots' for their crimes" may indicate that it is "cruel
and unusual" to "execute persons who are profoundly or severely retarded
and wholly lacking the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their
actions" for the same reasons which justify the insanity defense in criminal
law.9" The Court further noted that the justification used in Ford v. Wain-
wright to invalidate the death penalty for the insane should prohibit the
death penalty for the mentally retarded.' However, the Court refused to
address this needed expansion of Eighth Amendment substantive protection
by distinguishing Penry's situation from one in which such expansion might
be warranted. The Court skirted this issue by citing the jury's rejection of
the insanity defense and emphasizing the absence of explicit bans on execu-
tion of the mentally retarded in state capital statutes.9
Unless the Court abandons this restrictive reading of what constitutes
"cruel and unusual" punishment, the Eighth Amendment protection may
no longer be properly read to reflect the "evolving standards of decency"
held by the community. 8 Further, unless growth of the substantive
protections continues, procedural protections may also be inadequate. In
cases such as Herrera, the procedural protections will fail to prevent execu-
tion of an innocent person, something clearly unacceptable by community
standards. If one combines the Herrera Court's extensive emphasis on
conviction and sentence resulting from a "fair trial" as protection of the
innocent with the Strickler Court's arguable adoption of a "fair enough"
93. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
94. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333-34 (1989).
95. Id. at 333.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 333-34.
98. See Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Pro-Death, SelfFulfilling Constitutional Construct: The
Supreme Court's Evolving Standard ofDecency for the Death Penalty, 23 HAST. CoNST. L. Q.
455 (1996), for an in-depth analysis of the evolving standard of decency used by the Court in
Eighth Amendment capital jurisprudence and suggestions on how to increase the Court's
awareness of the actu views of the community by, in part, recognizing that procedural
mechanisms such as death qualification of juries, use of anti-sympathy instructions, and use
of victim-impact evidence stack the deck against the accurate use of jury sentencing as an
indicator of the community consensus.
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standard for capital trials, whether a "fair enough" trial would be adequate
to execute an innocent person surfaces and looms awaiting decision. It
seems that the Court would face a much more difficult decision in such a
case. Perhaps this is the decision which one must await to truly assess the
constitutionality of execution of the innocent. Until then, the recognition
of "evolution" of the standard of decency will remain frozen.

